The mind-body problem(s) in Descartes’ “Meditations” and Husserl’s “Crisis” (Part1) by Leonov, Andrii
ISSN 2522-9338. Філософська думка. 2020. № 4 91
Citat ion: Leonov, A. (2020). The mind-body problem(s) in Descartes’ “Meditations” and Husserl’s 




Andrii LEONOV, Master of Philosophy, 
Doctoral Student at the Department of Philosophy,
School of Humanities, 
Rice University, 
MS 14, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas, 77251-1892, United States
andrii.leonov@rice.edu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4174-9734
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) 
IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” 
AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 1)
The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus-
serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus 
“Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one 
mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and 
conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level 
is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation 
is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenom-
enology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems 
that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.
Keywords: ontological (traditional) mind-body problem, conceptual mind-body problem, transcen-
dental phenomenology, the lived-body (der Leib), Descartes, Husserl
The whole history of philosophy since the appearance of 
”epistemology” and the serious attempts at a transcendental
 philosophy is a history of tremendous tensions between 
objectivistic and transcendental philosophy. … 
The clarification of the origin of this internal split 
in the philosophical development, the analysis of 
the ultimate motives for this most radical transformation 
of the idea of philosophy, is of the utmost importance.
E. Husserl  1
1 [Husserl, 1970: p. 70; Hua VI, S. 71].
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Introduction  2
Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that invites us to address the things 
themselves (die Sachen selbst), as they are given in our experience from the first-
person perspective. Also, phenomenology is about dealing with the problems or 
matters themselves, in order to clarify and show their original meaning. Thus, phe-
nomenology is dealing with problems immediately, rather than mediately — that is, 
as they are given in our intuition. Therefore, the main justificatory basis for all phe-
nomenological investigations is phenomenological evidence. 
 In this paper, my key “die Sache selbst” will be the celebrated mind-body 
problem. In the phenomenological tradition, this problem is mostly ignored as 
the metaphysical one 3. But, it is one of the foundational problems in the con-
temporary philosophy of mind. Here, I want to explicate the discussion of the 
mind-body problem in the context of Husserlian phenomenology (especially, 
his “Crisis”).
Conventionally, the origins of this problem date back to Renés Descartes 
and his “Meditations on the First Philosophy”. Here, I will argue that Descartes 
had not just one, but two mind-body problems. The first one is explicit: the 
mind-body (brain) problem. How can our immaterial mind or soul interact 
with the material body (brain)? This problem has been widely discussed for 
generations by philosophers and was thoroughly developed within the philoso-
phy of mind tradition.
The second one is implicit: I argue that Descartes’ res cogitans can also be un-
derstood as a concept the meaning of which is amathematical, as opposed to res 
extensa, which is a purely mathematical concept (subject-matter to pure mathe-
matics). Thus, Descartes’ implicit mind-body problem can be formulated as the 
conceptual mind-body problem. 
And the very Cartesian framework can be considered from this two-fold per-
spective:
1. From the ontological perspective: as a gap between two ontologically different 
realms: material (body) and immaterial (mind);
2. And the conceptual one — as a gap between two different meanings: (proto) 
phenomenological meaning (mental; intellectual), which is asensible and asymbol-
ic, and natural-scientific one (physical), which is sensible and symbolic (as the 
subject-matter of mathematics).
2 In this paper, the attitude of my dealing with Descartes’ philosophy and Husserl’s phenome-
nology is neutral. Regarding Husserl, for example, it is not analytic (or West-Coast), nor conti-
nental (East-Coast). My attitude here is problem oriented: the main focus is made on the “mind-
body problems” in Descartes and Husserl, and how Husserl’s phenomenology (namely, as 
depicted in “The crisis of the European sciences”) can be analyzed in this light. The same goes 
for Descartes: I am not interested in framing myself into this or that methodology while dealing 
with Descartes’ philosophy. I am involving this or that thinker only if he or she are relevant to 
the discussion taking place in this paper.
3 Though, there are exceptions, e.g., [Smith, 1995; 2013; Gallagher, Zahavi, 2013: p. 123-125].
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I will try to prove that Husserl has answers for both traditional and the concep-
tual mind-body problems.
Furthermore, one of the main ideas of the paper is to show that Husserl’s 
“Crisis” represents not just one “crisis of the European sciences”, but two:
1) As a gap between the life-world and the natural sciences (as explicated in 
Husserl’s critique of Galileo);
2) The opposition between the natural sciences (physicalism) and the transcendental 
phenomenology. I think that, this crisis stems from the Cartesian metaphysics of res 
cogitans and res extensa (namely, from what I call the “conceptual” mind-body prob-
lem) and thus, is the “crisis” within the Cartesian framework, as well as of the latter. 
I will put the major emphasis in this paper on the latter crisis and its origin and, 
will therefore omit the general discussion regarding the former (the life-world), 
though mention it only with regards to Husserl’s understanding of the “traditional” 
mind-body problem.
In alliance with Husserl, I claim that Descartes’ discovery of the res cogitans (as 
mens) opened the realm of transcendental subjectivity, and although Husserl’s main 
target for the “crisis of the European sciences” is Galileo (relating the problem of 
the mathematization of nature), I want to demonstrate that the “modern opposition 
between physicalist objectivism and transcendental subjectivism” clearly has its ori-
gin in Descartes’ “Meditations” and his main phenomenological discovery.
Part 1. Two mind-body problems in Descartes’ “Meditations” 
Although, the Second and the Sixth Meditations  4 are considered to be the most 
important parts regarding the mind-body problem in Descartes’ “Meditations”, 
my references will be made to the whole corpus of these texts. I will follow this ap-
proach in order to demonstrate the difference between my understanding of the 
“traditional” mind-body problem and the “conceptual” mind-problem. 
1.1. The traditional mind-body problem
The core of the traditional mind-body problem is the ontological distinction 
between mind (consciousness, soul) as something immaterial, non-physical and 
body (biological organism) as something material or physical. In contemporary 
philosophy of mind, the very heart  5 of the mind-body problem is the hard problem 
of consciousness, which can be stated in the following manner: “why does our brain 
produce consciousness, if everything in the physical theory is compatible with its 
absence?” In other words, “why aren’t we just zombies, who in every respect are 
just like us, but lack the very things that make us human beings: phenomenal con-
sciousness, or the ‘what-it-is-likeness’ of our experience”? Thus, the essence of it 
is an explanation of our consciousness and brain relation. Therefore, the essence of 
the traditional mind-body problem today is the “consciousness-brain” problem.
4 For example, one can see it here: [Chalmers, 2002].
5 [Crane, 2000]
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Contemporary battles in the philosophy of mind can be summarized as those 
between physicalists and non-physicalists. The hard problem of consciousness is 
the central obstacle for the physicalist explanation of our mental life and phe-
nomenology  6.
No doubt, the origins of the traditional mind-body problem one can find in 
Descartes’ “Meditations”. The main issue of the traditional mind-body problem 
is that of metaphysics or ontology. What substance (or fundamental reality) is pri-
mary: res cogitans (the thinking thing) or res extensa (the extended thing)? 
Descartes’ answer is well known: he is a thinking thing  7, which he identifies with 
soul  8. By the latter, Descartes understood what is indivisible and non-physical, 
and which is epistemically and ontologically prior to whatever is physical and ex-
tended and perceived by senses. By body (corpus) Descartes also understood what 
is “my own body”  9, or as composition of organs and limbs. Thus, if my primary 
being is a thinking thing, my existence as a physical (and one can say biological) 
body is a secondary one.
But that being said, one doesn’t have to understand Descartes as a solipsist. 
His all-bracketing doubt is nothing but a thought experiment; one of the purposes of 
which was the clarification of our ontology. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes is 
talking about human nature as a “composite”, which has both mind and body. One 
of Descartes’ goals was therefore to show that our primary ontology is that of mind 
(soul, psyche or consciousness). It is given to us directly, rather than physical reali-
ty, which is given to us indirectly (through the mediation of senses).
6 The originator of the hard problem of consciousness is the Australian philosopher David Chalm-
ers. The classical statement of this problem and its treatment one can find here: [Chalmers, 
1995; 1996].
7 “I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or 
intellect, or reason… (sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive 
intellectus, sive ratio…)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27]. “What then am I? A thing that 
thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, 
and also imagines and has sensory perceptions (Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est 
hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginas quoque, & sen-
tiens)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 19; 1957: p. 28].
8 “…[S]ense-perceptions and thinking (sentire & cogitare); and these actions I attributed to the 
soul (…quas quidem actiones ad animam referebam)” [Ibidem, p. 17; Descartes, 1957: p. 26].
9 The following footnote in the Cottingham’s translation expresses this ambiguity: “The Latin 
term corpus as used here by Descartes is ambiguous as between ‘body’ (i.e. corporeal matter in 
general) and ‘the body’ (i.e. this particular body of mine). The French version preserves the 
ambiguity” [Descartes, 2008: p. 54]. 
“Well, the first thought to come to my mind was that I had a face, hands, arms and the 
whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called body 
(Nempe occuberat primo, me habere vultum, manus, brachia, totamque hanc membrorum 
machinam, quails etiam in canvere cernitur, & quam corporis nomine dignabam)” [Ibidem, 
p. 17; Descartes, 1957: p. 26]. “I am not that structure of limbs which I call a human body 
(…non sum compages illa membrorum, quae corpud humanum appellatur…)” [Descartes, 
2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27].
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1.2. The conceptual mind-body problem
The conceptual mind-body problem is the problem of “mind” and “body” as 
con cepts, which have different meanings. Thus, it is the problem of meanings, rather 
than of ontologies. 
In this light, res extensa is a concept of a physical thing and its meaning is the 
subject-matter of pure mathematics  10 and thus can be formalized (quantified) and 
is symbolic concept in its essence. 
Res cogitans is the concept of a non-physical thing, which cannot be quantified 
(formalized or mathematized). Thus, it is asymbolic concept  11.
As we have seen, ontologically res cogitans is prior to res extensa. The same 
goes for them as semantical concepts — res cogitans possesses meaning, which is 
primary in relation to that of res extensa. That is, subjective meaning, which is 
grounded in intuition and is asymbolic, is primary in relation to the physical mean-
ing, which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics. 
In this sense, subjective meaning is more “objective” and primary for us than 
that of physics, which is relative in its essence, and is the subject-matter of the 
mathematical sciences  12. Further, corporeal nature, which is quantifiable, is given 
to us through asymbolic (immediate) intuition. Namely the latter fulfills the former, 
which is given symbolically (mediately). Mathematics and physics are not invented 
by our intuition, but nevertheless, are discovered and given through it. Subjective 
meaning (as self-evident, guaranteed by God’s existence and indubitable) is pri-
mary. Physico-mathematical meaning is secondary. In other words, res extensa is 
10 For example, in the end of the Fifth Meditation, Descartes is talking about “the whole of that 
corporeal nature which is the subject-matter of pure mathematics (…tum etiam de omni illa 
natura corporea, quae est purae Metheseos objectum…)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 49; 1957: p. 71].
11 By symbolic, I mean that, which can be expressed through the means of mathematics or math-
ematical (formal/symbolic) logic. By asymbolic, I mean that, which cannot be expressed 
symbo lically in the given sense.
12 As Descartes puts it in the First Meditation: “…physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other disci-
plines which depend on the study of composite things, are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry 
and other subjects of this kind, which deal with only with the simplest kind, which deal only with 
the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, con-
tain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added 
together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transpar-
ent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. (…Physicam, Astronomiam, Medicinam, 
disciplinasque alias omnes, qua a rerum compositarum consideration dependent, dubias quidem 
esse; atqui Arithmeticam, Geometricam, aliasque ejusmodi, quae nonnisi de simplicissimis & 
maxime generalibus rebus tractant, atque utrum eae sint in rerum natura necne, parum currant, 
aliquid certi atque indubitati continere. Nam sive vigilerm, sive dormiam, duo & tria simul juncta 
sunt quinque, quadratumque non plura habetlatera quam quatuor; nec sieri posse videtur ut tam 
perspicuae veritates in suspicionem falsitatis incurrant)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 14; 1957: p. 20].
In this sense, there is some contradiction regarding the essence of the physical objects 
(which is relative and thus, dubitable), and that of pure mathematics, which is in its essence 
indubitable. The question can be put in the following way: “How can something dubitable in 
its essence (physical objects) be the subject-matter of that, which is indubitable in its nature 
(i.e., pure mathematics)?”
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given through res cogitans. But again, towards the end of the “Meditations”, De-
scartes considers the mind-body relation in its unity, which can be reinterpreted as 
the unity of asymbolic res cogitans and the symbolic res extensa. 
Let’s sum up what was just said. Res extensa appears to be the concept of the 
physical thing, which in its essence is quantifiable, and as such is a subject-matter 
of pure mathematics. Res cogitans is the concept of the non-physical thing, which 
is given to us in intuition and is self-evident, and is essentially not quantifiable. 
Thus, the meaning of the res cogitans cannot be expressed symbolically. Its nature 
is asymbolic. On the other hand, res extensa can be fully expressed through math-
ematical symbols; therefore, its nature is symbolic. Hence, res cogitans’s meaning 
is primary for us and is grasped in intuition immediately. The meaning of res ex-
tensa is given to us in intuition as well, but mediately (through symbols). In other 
words, res cogitans is a phenomenological concept which opens door to the dimen-
sion of phenomenological meaning. Res extensa is a physical concept, which in its 
essence is mathematizable, and expresses the meaning of the natural sciences. Thus, 
one can already see the essence of the conceptual mind-body problem here at 
hand: as the gap between phenomenological meaning and that of natural sciences. In 
my opinion, this is the very beginning and origin of one of the crises of the European 
sciences (namely, as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and the 
natural sciences), as portrayed in Husserl’s last work.
As mentioned-above, the Second and the Sixth Meditations are considered to 
be the most important Cartesian Meditations necessary for grasping the essence of 
the mind-body problem and Descartes metaphysics. Here, in this section, I want 
to attempt to look at those two Meditations in a different light.
Some Case Studies
Second Meditation
In this Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between wax as given through the 
senses, and as given through mind (mens). It appears that the true nature of the wax 
is not as something which has taste, smell, color, size, shape and is able to produce 
sound, but as something “extended, flexible and changeable” (extensum quid, fle-
xibile, mutabile)  13 [Descartes, 2008: p. 20; 1957: p. 31]. And the very essence of 
wax as something changeable and flexible is grasped not by our faculty of imagina-
tion, which still depends on our senses, but “by the mind alone” (sed sola mente 
percipere) [Descartes, 2008: p. 21; 1957: p. 31]. Thus, the real perception of wax is 
nothing “but of purely mental scrutiny” (sed solis mentis inspectio) [Ibidem].
Thus, wax as a physical thing has two kinds of givenness:
13 “So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the 
features which I arrived at by means of the senses; for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, 
touch or hearing has now altered — yet the wax remains.” (Quid erat igitur in ea quod ׀ tam 
distincte comprehendebatur? Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam quaecunque 
sub gustum, vel odoratum, vel visum, vel tactum vel auditum veniebant, mutate jam sunt: re-
manet cera) [Descartes, 2008: p. 20; 1957: p. 30].
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1) Sensory and imaginary givenness: color, taste, smell, touch, sound, shape, 
size. This kind of givenness is not essential one. It is dubitable (as everything, which 
is given through senses) and thus, contingent.
2) Mental or intellectual givenness: wax as “extended, flexible and changeable” is es-
sential, indubitable   14 and necessary  15. Namely this kind of givenness represents phy-
sical thing as res extensa and is given through mind (or res cogitans) only. There fore, 
res extensa (the essence of the physical thing) is given through res cogitans.
Sixth Meditation
Here, Descartes still distinguishes between mind as pure understanding 
(pu ram intellectionem) and imagination (imaginationem) as based on sensory per-
ception, which represent corporeal nature as a subject-matter of pure mathematics 
[Descartes, 2008: p.50-51; 1957: p. 72-74]. Although, here Descartes stres ses the 
unity 16 or combination of mind and body  17 rather than their division; mind with its 
faculty of pure understanding still has the epistemological priority: for example, stars 
as given through senses do not represent their actual size, and only mind is capable of 
their true representation  18. In the composite of the mind and body (composito ex 
mente & corpore), sensory (or bodily) perception has the function of providing the 
information to the mind about “what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of 
which the mind is a part…” (…quia nempe sensuous perceptionibus, quae propirie 
tantum a natura datae sunt ad menti significandum quaenam composito, cujus pars 
est, commode sint vel incomoda…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 57; 1957: p. 82-83].
Our body or corporeal nature in general as extended is a subject-matter of pure 
mathematics because they are divisible (divisibile). By contrast, mind cannot be ex-
pressed mathematically, because it is indivisible (indivisibilis): willing, understand-
ing, sensory perceptions are not parts of the mind, but “it is one and the same mind 
14 That is, one cannot doubt that the essence of the physical thing is extension. Though, it does 
not mean that one cannot doubt the very existence of the extended things.
15 In this Meditation, before the wax example, Descartes states: “At present I am not admitting 
anything except what is necessarily true” (nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum) 
[Descartes, 2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27].
16 “…I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but I am very closely 
joined and, as it were intermingled with it, so that I and body form a unit.” (…me non tantum 
adesse meo corpori ut natura adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi per-
mixtum, adeo ut unum quid illo componam) [Descartes, 2008: p. 56; 1957: p. 81].
17 “…I am a combination of body and mind…” (…corpore & mente sum compositus…) [Des-
cartes, 2008: p. 56; 1957: p. 80].
18 “For knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to the mind alone, not to the 
combination mind and body. Hence, although a star has no greater effect on my eye than the 
flame of a small light, there is no inclination in me to believe that the star is no bigger that the 
light; I have simply made this judgement from childhood onwards without any rational ba-
sis.” (…quia de iis verum scire as mentem solam, non autem ad compositum, vidfetur perti-
nere. Ita quamvis stella non magis oculum ׀ meum quam ignis exiquae facis afficiat, nulla 
tamen in eo realis sive positive propensio est ad credendum illam non esse majorum, sed hoc 
sine ratione ab inuente aetate judicavi…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 57; 1957: p. 83].
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that wills, and understands and has sensory perceptions” (…quia una & eadem mens 
est quae vult, quae sentit, quae intel׀ligt) [Descartes, 2008: p. 59; 1957: p. 86].
The solution to the ontological mind-body problem has a neuroscientific incli-
nation: only the brain (tantummodo a cerebro) is the connection between mind 
and body, and that, which affects mind immediately (or maybe, some part of the 
brain, by which Descartes understood the pineal gland (conarion)) [Descartes, 
2008: p. 59-60; 1957: p. 86].
If to speak about the conceptual mind-body problem, in the context of mind-
body unity or “the nature of man as a combination of mind and body” (naturam 
hominis ut ex mente & corpore compositi)  19, I think we can suggest that the phe-
nomenological meaning as expressed by res cogitans is prior to the physical-mathe-
matical meaning, as expressed by res extensa. That is, though phenomenology and 
natural sciences are essentially different, nevertheless, they form the composite, in 
which phenomenology is epistemically prior to the natural sciences and is more 
significant for us, but that does not mean that they must be apart from each other.
A Note on Descartes’ Notion of “Intellect”
It has to be noticed that Descartes uses “intellect” in a twofold way. The first 
one is “intellect” as the synonym of “mind” (mens) and “thinking thing” (res cogi-
tans) in general. Already in the Second Meditation, one can meet the following 
statement: “At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. 
I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am mind (mens), or 
intelligence (animus), or intellect (intellectus), or reason (ratio)…” [Descartes, 
2008: p. 18; 1957: p. 27]. It’s clear that Descartes finds it necessarily true.
In the beginning of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes is distinguishing between 
pure understanding (puram intellectionem) (or power of understanding (a vi intel-
ligendi)) and imagination (imagionationem) (or power of imagining (vim imagi-
nandi)) and sensory perception (sensu perceptae) [Descartes, 2008: p. 50-51; 1957: 
p. 72-73]. As it was noted, the former is essential to our mind, the latter is not  20. 
Later on, Descartes follows the same argument:
“[…] I find in myself faculties for certain special modes of thinking (modis 
cogitandi), namely imagination and sensory perception (imaginandi & sentiendi). 
Now I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these facul-
ties; but I cannot, conversely, understand these faculties without me, that is, with-
out an intellectual substance  21 (substancia intelligente) to inhere it. This is because 
there is an intellectual act (intellectionem) included in their essential definition; 
and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and myself corresponds to 
19 [Descartes, 2008: p. 61; 1957: p. 88].
20 “…I consider that this power of imagining which is in me, differing as it does from the power 
of understanding, is not necessary constituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my 
mind” (…considero istam vim imaginandi quae in me est, prout differ a vi intelligendi, ad mei 
ipsius, hoc est ad mentis meae essentiam non require…) [Descartes, 2008: p. 51; 1957: p. 73].
21 Italics are mine. — A.L.
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the distinction between the modes of a thing and the thing itself” [Descartes, 2008: 
p. 54; 1957: p. 78].
In this sense, intellect, as a thinking thing, contains subjective experience or 
qua litative feel. To illustrate this, let me cite the very important passage from the 
Second Meditation: “…even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagina-
tion are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part 
of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same I who has sensory perceptions, or is aware 
of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, 
hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep and, so all this is false. Yet, I cer-
tainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 
“having a sensory perception” is strictly just this, and in this is restricted sense of 
the term it is simply thinking” [Descartes, 2008: p. 19; 1957: p. 29].
In the Third Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between thoughts as “images” 
(or “ideas”) and other thoughts with the additional variation of forms including 
volitions and emotions  22.
But further, in the Sixth Meditation, it seems there is an implication that intel-
lect has nothing to do with subjective experience and qualia: 
“Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so 
on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that 
I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body 
form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing (res cogi-
tans), would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage 
purely by the intellect  23 (puro intellectu) just as a sailor perceives by sight if any-
thing in his ship is broken, Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should 
have an explicit understanding (expresse intelligerem) of the fact, instead of hav-
ing confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, 
pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the 
union  24 and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body” [Descartes, 2008: 
p. 56; 1957: p. 81].
As one can see, here, in the Sixth Meditation’ passage, intellect is not identical 
with res cogitans, as opposed to the Second Meditation, where intellect, even if the 
objects of sensory perception do not exist, still seems to have the very perceptions of 
them, as if these objects really existed. And the very perceptions (seeing or hearing 
something, feeling pain, hunger or thirst, being warmed etc.) cannot be false, even 
if the real objects which caused them were inexistent, because intellect (ego) have 
them as intentional objects, which are accompanied with qualitative feel. 
22 “…thus when I will (volo), or am afraid (timeo), or affirm (affirmo), or deny (nego), there is 
always a particular thing which I take as the object of thought (subjectum meae cogitationis 
apprehendo), but my thought (cogitationes) includes something more than the likeness of the 
thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions (voluntates) or emotions (affectus), 
while others are called judgements (judicia)” [Descartes, 2008: p. 26; 1957: p. 37]
23 Italics are mine. — A.L.
24 Italics are mine. — A.L.
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Thus, in the Sixth Meditation passage, cited-above, intellect has a role of an 
information-processing tool with nothing subjective as its companion. And the very 
qualitative sensations are caused by the union of mind (mens) with the body (cor-
pus), and thus, do not belong essentially to the intellect. Therefore, those, who are 
inclined to label Descartes as “pure intellectualist” only in this latter sense, have to 
mind the very ambiguity of the Cartesian notion of intellect in general.
(To be continued)
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